Nebraska Law Review
Volume 47 | Issue 3

1968

"Institutional" Theory and a New Private "Club":
Court Enforcement of Union Fines
Albert Broderick
Catholic University of America

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
Recommended Citation
Albert Broderick, "Institutional" Theory and a New Private "Club": Court Enforcement of Union Fines, 47 Neb. L. Rev. 492 (1968)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol47/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Article 5

"INSTITUTIONAL" THEORY AND A NEW PRIVATE
"CLUB": COURT ENFORCEMENT OF UNION FINES
Albert Broderick*
In England and in the United States the association of working
men in labor unions has been traditionally legally analyzed in
terms of "contract." The hypothesis considered here is that recent
developments in American labor law make it timely for purposes
of administrative law, at least, to discard the legal analysis of the
labor association as a "contract" among members, and to substitute
a theory of "institution" as more in accord with the existing facts.
The adoption of such an analysis would open up a new field of
administrative law, one that sociologists (more frequently than
lawyers) have referred to as "private government."
The concept of "institution" has been widely used for thirty
years or more in sociology without any demonstrable precision as
to its meaning. It was first introduced as a legal "category" with
some specificity sixty years ago by Maurice Hauriou, the leading
voice among a group of French jurists who have come to be known
as "institutionalists."' It is in the sense refined by Hauriou that we
take up its relevance to the present situation of the labor union
2
in American law.

The decision of the Supreme Court last term in Allis-Chalmers
v. NLRB3 presents a sharp focus for considering the relevance of
a legal theory of "institution." The Court divided 5-4 in ruling that
*

A.B., Princeton; LL.B., S.J.D., Harvard; D.Phil., Oxford; Asociate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America.

1 Maurice Hauriou (1856-1929)

2

was Dean of the Faculty of Law of the

University of Toulouse from 1906 to 1929. His writings include twelve
editions of a classic work on droit administratif, two editions of a
volume on public law, and two editions of a work on constitutional
law.
His most concise presentation of his institutional theory is La thdorie
de l'institution et de la fondation, 4, CARTERS DE LA NOUVELLE JOURNLE
(1925) [hereinafter cited as La thdorie de i'institution]. This essay

together with other selections from Hauriou and his "institutionalist"

followers, Georges Renard (of Nancy), Joseph T. Delos (of Lille), and

3

Jean Br6the de la Grassaye (of Bordeaux), law professors all, will
appear in the first English translation of the writings of the French
Institutionalists, which is being published by the Harvard University
Press in the Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy Series in 1968. Current revival of interest in Hauriou is further indicated by an international colloquium which was held at the University of Toulouse,
March 11-14, 1968, at which papers on Hauriou were read by jurists
from France, Latin America, Spain, Germany, and the United States.
388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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it was not an "unfair labor practice" under existing labor legislation
for a union to impose fines upon recalcitrant members and to seek
to enforce its internal fines by court action. Ten opinions were
written in the administrative body (NLRB) and appellate courts
(Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit and Supreme Court); most
of these opinions treated the case as merely a complex exercise in
statutory interpretation. Only two of the opinions (those of Circuit Judges Hastings and Kiley) gave intimation of any ingredients
of an "institutional" theory, although Justice Brennan's prevailing
opinion took official note of a decline in regard for the "contract"
theory of association as applied to labor unions. In this article we
shall, after recalling some central themes of Hauriou, review the
background legislation, give consideration to the various opinions
filed, and search out the analytical power of Hauriou's theory of the
institution in solving the problem of enforcement of union fines as
presented by the Allis-Chalmers case. From this study in depth
hopefully some conclusions may be tentatively proposed as to the
general utility to administrative law of a legal analysis of labor
unions as "institutions" rather than as associations sounding in
"contract."
I.

SOME RELEVANT "INSTITUTIONAL" THEMES

Four sets of themes relating to Hauriou's special brand of institutional theory are worth recalling before we examine AllisChalmers: his fundamental distinction between the internal affairs
of the "institution" or organized group and its external relations
with other groups (including the state; the special aspects of the
internal life of an institution-in what does its unity consist, what
are its relations to its members; the special aspects of its external
life, its relations with others, its standing with respect to the state
law and legal system; and finally the implications of the "personalist" theme which Hauriou claimed, in his final work, sounded a
central objective of institutional achievement.

A. THE DIsTINcTioN BETWEEN "INTERNAL" AmD "ExTEaNL" AFFAmS
Absolutely fundamental to Hauriou's theory of the institution
as an instrument of legal or social analysis is his distinction between
the institution, or group, looked at from within, and its external
relations with the outside world.4 The United States of America as
a national state has external relations with other nations and
groups. Looked at by them it is a unit, a member of the international
society of state units. Looked at from within by its members it is
a set of ideas and understandings and centralized and decentralized
4

La thgorie de Vinstitution, supra note 2, at 43.
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governmental arrangements. Hauriou would carry over the analogy
of the state to private groups. 5
Hauriou distinguishes between two types of legal rules from
the standpoint of their content: Themis and Dike.6 The Themis-type
rules are those which bear upon the internal governmental life of
the institution-both (a) the "disciplinary" power (droit disciplinaire) which embraces group-member or "governor-governed" directives, And (b) the legal restrictions upon the exercise of this
power for which the members have won an acceptance (droit statutaire). The Dike type rules, on the other hand, focus on membermember relations. They have as their basic foundation, Hauriou
contends, not state governmental power but the demands and understandings of human sociability.
B. INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Hauriou's view of the internal "life" of an institution centers
upon his concept that the "reality" of a group as distinct from its
members is grasped in understanding an institution as a group of
men (and perhaps of sub-groups of men) who have joined together
to achieve the fulfillment of certain "leading ideas." To fulfill these
ideas certain arrangements are made-power is organized, laws are
enacted, methods are established to resolve difficulties within the

group.
Such an institution may be regarded from two aspects, or in
accordance with two models, which we may imprecisely designate
as the founding model and the pure development model. The founding model, whose characteristics were stressed in Hauriou's classic

1925 essay,7 conceives a founder or group of founders as organizing
a group of persons to achieve an idea or set of ideas concerning a
project or enterprise to be undertaken. In this model, which is well

exemplified by the launching of a business company, the "leading
ideas" are present at the outset as objectives to be achieved. The

founders may retain the direction for a time, but gradually the
power of direction of the institution and the totality of its advantages may come to be shared with co-members or co-workers-they
come to have "communion" in the "ideas" (which themselves may

undergo a process of development). But there is another model
for an "institution": a group may have been in existence for some
5 La Thdorie de Vinstitution, supra note 2, at 12, 14, 33, 35.

6 One chronic difficulty with Hauriou is his unfamiliar terminology. The

Themis-Dike distinction is of great importance but cannot be done
justice here. Roughly, it corresponds to Aristotle's pairing into commutative justice and distributive justice.
7 La thdorie de rinstitution,supra note 2.
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time without its members' reflecting upon any goals to be pursued,
or it may be long under the domination of a single person or of an
oligrarchy. When there emerges an articulation of its goals and a
greater participation by members in their achievement this type of
group may fit, just as well as the founding model, Hauriou's notion
of an "institution."
In the tensions recognized by Hauriou's theory of the institution are many of the conflicting themes which have been of great
interest to recent political sociology. Particularly do they find
responsive notes in the studies on bureaucracy dealing with cleavage
and consensus."
Hauriou's concept of an institution centered on the notion of
"an idea" or "leading ideas," "idea-actions" of a work to be accomplished 9-that of a state to govern a nation, or a business corporation to gain money for its shareholders by conduct of certain activities, or of a labor union to achieve economic and social benefits for
its members. 10 Hauriou conceives that some form of authority develops which is recognized by the members, certain explicitations of
the ideas (order, liberty, justice, equality, democracy for the state;
certain specific forms of business activity for the corporation; a certain type of economic and social advantage for the membership of
a union)1 and a certain life rhythm. The ideas gradually come to
be more than just goals or objectives. They take on life-styles (e.g.
"more or less" democracy). Hauriou conceives that as (in the founding model) the ideas, first held by a few founders, an elite, become
more and more "institutionalized," they come to be shared more
and more by the individual members. To Hauriou these ideas shared
8 See S. LiPs.T, PoIcCAT MAN (1st ed. 1960) and his essay Lipset,
Political Sociology, SOCIOLOGY TODAY (R.Merton ed. 1959).
9 Hauriou's final definition of an "institution" in a juridicial sense was
contained in his last published work. An institution is "A social organization that has become durable, that is, which preserves its specific
form in spite of the constant renewal of the human matter that it contains when it is instituted. To be instituted means (1) that the directing idea which is in it from the moment of its foundation has been
able to subordinate the power of government thanks to balances of
organs and powers, and (2) that this system of ideas and balances of
powers has been ratified, in its form, by the consent of the members
of the institution as well as by that of the social milieu. Finally, the
form of the institution, which is its durable element, consists in a system of balances and consents constructed around an idea." M. HAninou,
PRfCIS DE DROrI CONSTUMNnAL 172-74 (2nd ed. Paris 1929). It is clear,
then, that to Hauriou not every organization is fully an "institution,"
some are in via.
10 Cf. La thdorie de L'institution, supra note 2, at 12, 14.
11 For example, insurance or retirement plans.
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by the members are the institution itself. The ideas also serve the
function of giving direction to the legislative and executive, even
"constitutional," decisions made on behalf of the institution. In a
certain sense they are the rallying point for a continuing reaffirmation of the legitimacy of the institutional authority with respect to
its members.
This concept of an "institution" is far from the model of rationalized bureaucracy envisioned by Max Weber.1 2 Hauriou used
for it the biological metaphor of organism and spoke of its "life"
and "death." The institution exists for the benefit of its members,
that they might share in the achievement of its "ideas" as they develop. This connotes an organization whose existence is sustained
by internal balances and tensions, by conflicts among organs and
among members, and by competing variations of suggested ways
and means for achieving the ideas, and of suggested forms or styles
of development of the basic ideas. There is consensus, communion
in the basic ideas; there is cleavage resulting from the differences
among the human beings who compose it. Hauriou fully anticipates
the restlessness that field studies of bureaucracy would later indicate would result from the relentless, rationalized pursuit of bureaucratic goals. 13 The ideas are, Hauriou insists, sets of basic "ends and
means."' 4 The ideas are not rigid goals, but, as Renard would later
style them, "themes for development."' 5 The authority is to some
extent centralized, but decentralized also-the separation of organs.
Society itself is a composite of different institutions, one serving as
a counter-weight to another. The peace and happiness of the society
is achieved somehow by a series of shifting balances of these institutions, rather than by a rigorous hierarchy among them.
Society is conceived by Hauriou as composed of individual persons and groups, many of these groups being organized or institutionalized. At the pinnacle, in a legal sense, is the state, the governmental institution or institutions. Like the others it proceeds in
realization of certain ideas, and acts through organs in accordance
with accepted procedures, which like the "leading ideas" are subject to development and creative growth. From this governmental
model, Hauriou conceives the contagious development of other
organizations of the society into "institutions." When they do develop in this way, they are entitled, almost as a matter of right, to
12

See Weber, Zur Lage der burgerlichen Democratie in Russland, 22
ARcmv FUR SOzn=WISSENSCHAPT U

SozIALPoLTiK 234 (1906).

13 See Gouldner, OrganizationalAnalysis, SocIoLoGY TODAY (R. Merton
'4

ed. 1959).
La th~rie de Linstitution,supra note 2. at 13.

15 G. REARD, LA TmHOmm DE 'iNsrTuTi N (Paris 1931).
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be regarded as legal systems, and be given the needed stimulus
from the state institution to maintain their existence and to seek
their own fulfillment.

Within a particular institution, according to Hauriou's theory,
persons become members by a form of consent: this "consent" need
not be completely voluntary. There may be an element of "involuntariness," as for example in a citizen's adherence in an existing state.
But a sufficient element of voluntariness is necessary to make his
enlistment more than the result of mere force (coactus volui, sed
volui).*16 The consent is given on "enrollment" to the total institution, including its arrangements for initiating changes in previously
existing understandings by enactment or by creative development
of "the ideas."
The two characteristic forms of internal group law are the
"droit disciplinaire"or governmental power, and the "droit statutaire," the recognized limitations upon this power. Within droit
disciplinaire,except as specifically restricted by droit statutaire,
is
17
included a power to sanction violations of intra-group law.
C. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Each institution is conceived as having an external life wherein
the group, or someone designated to act on its behalf, engages in
relations with other groups. 8 For example, the most obvious reason
for the existence of a labor union is to enter into collective bargaining arrangements with employers. The national state, through its
authorized representatives, makes "contracts" (treaties) with other
states, or conducts wars. One aspect of the external life of a private
group-institution concerns its relation to the national state. In Hauriou's view, even a group which is recognized as a "real" institutionalized person by the national society is subject to Themis-type regulation by the nation group. Like individual persons, the institutionalized group is a unit subject to whatever type of control the national
institution is permitted, by its own institutional arrangements and
"ideas," to exercise, as "police power" (policy)19 over the individuals
and groups. Hauriou's own political views recognize areas in which
state intervention would be salutary, but his own disposition (not
a necessary aspect of his institutional theory) favors a light hand by
1 La thdorie de rinstitution,supra note 2, at 2.
137See text accompanying note 6 supra.

18 La thgorie de institution, supra note 2, at 43.
19 Hauriou uses the word policy in the broad, earlier sense. Cf. F. MAITLAND, JUSTICE AN Ponic- (London 1885): "such part of social organization as is concerned immediately with the maintenance of good
order ...."
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the state on private affairs. His view is not that positive law ascribes
to private groups the total extent of their activities, but rather that
law prescribes limits upon their power and right to engage in specific activities. To Hauriou institutions, not rules of law, are the
20
dynamic force in society.

D.

PERSONALIST IMPLICATIONS
Hauriou has a nuanced view of the complexities of the political
and legal art, and a sociological commitment to a precise examination of facts of social life bearing on a specific political or legal decision. His conclusion that the role of law is to preserve social order,
and beyond that to "institute" a society of "persons," therefore, does
not give a ready principle for the solution of a complicated case. But
it does suggest an orientation towards individual liberty when it
is in tension with economic advance, and towards a form of state
intervention directed towards private groups which is aimed chiefly
at protecting individual members against internal abuses of power.
While it is true that any state intervention, even of the sort which
insists upon internal procedural guarantees, detracts from the autonomy of an institution, it is a step towards "instituting" a society
that is a "social whole of personalities," in Hauriou's sense. Hauriou
views pluralism and institutional autonomy not as ends in themselves, but as steps towards securing the maximal individual freedom consistent with insuring social order and reasonable human
existence.
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

The National Labor Relations Act of 193521 was a key step in
establishing legislative support in the United States for the existence of labor unions, and in protecting them against attack on such
grounds as "conspiracy" or "restraint of trade." The Act was directed towards achieving stability in industrial relations by means
of collective-bargaining contracts negotiated between employers
and employees acting through a legally protected union. The Act
recognized that a union which was elected as representative of a
majority of the employees in a "bargaining unit" had power to bind
all employees in that unit as to terms and conditions of employment.
One permissible term of this "collective bargaining contract" was
the so-called "closed shop" arrangement, that no one who was not
already a member of the union which had been elected as bargaining representative could be hired, or retained in employment, by
20

Institutions "incarnate creative ideas of enterprise; legal rules only
represent ideas of limitations." La thgorie de r'institution,supra note
2, at 127.

21

National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
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an employer. The 1935 statute, in Section 7, specified certain activities as "rights" of employees:
The right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the 22
purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
A movement after World War II to curtail certain activities of
labor organizations culminated in the Labor Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947.2 Three modifications introduced by the
1947 legislation are of interest to us here. (1) The "closed shop" was
outlawed, and the union security provision was limited to a "union
shop" clause, which might require an employee to join the union,
which had been elected as bargaining agent for the unit, within
thirty days of his being hired. (2) The "section 7 rights" were expanded to give employees the additional right "to refrain from any
or all such activities" (as set out above). (3) The area of "unfair
labor practices" was enlarged to permit a complaint to the National
Labor Relations Board [hereinafter cited NLRB] by an employer
as well as an employee, and give rise to a "cease and desist" order
by the Board if the complaint was found justified. The clause which
is of particular interest here is section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the 1947 Act
which made it an unfair labor practice "to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7." To this
clause in the course of Senate debate there was added a proviso:
"Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein." The wide divergence of judicial views in Allis-Chalmers resulted from divergent
judicial meanings given three provisions of the 1947 Act: (1) The
amendment to section 7 (a); (2) the "coerce clause" (as we shall
hereinafter designate 8 (b) (1) (A) considered apart from its proviso) ; and (3) the proviso itself of 8 (b) (1) (A).24
22

28
24

"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protecttion, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158 (a) (3) of this title." 29
U.S.C.A. § 157.
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
Some of the judicial opinions treated the 1959 amendments to the Act
[Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act
of 1959, § 1, 73 Stat. 519 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.)]
as relevant to the interpretation of sections 7(a) and 8(b) (1) (A).
The 1959 Act was the first federal statute which professed to deal
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III. UNION FINES AND ALLIS-CHALMERS: BACKGROUND
AND FACTS: THEORIES AND ISSUES
A.

BACKGROUND ON UNION FINES

The practice of unions fining members for breach of internal
union regulations was apparently well accepted at the time of the
1947 legislation.25 But the question whether a fine imposed for
exercise of a section 7 right is a violation of the "coerce clause" of
8(b) (1) (A) was not squarely faced by the NLRB until AllisChalmers. And the further question whether a union's attempt to
enforce its fines against its members by court action constitutes
"coercion" did not come to the fore until the appellate phases of
Allis-Chalmers.

B. ALus-CHaxmms: THE

FACTS

The facts of the Allis-Chalmers case are simple and largely
undisputed. A local strike is called in accordance with the constituted procedures of the union, receiving the required approval of
two-thirds of its membership by secret vote. Certain members
decline to honor the strike vote and cross the union picket lines.
Their action is concededly in violation of provisions of the union
constitutions which provide for alternatives of expulsion or fines
as penalties for such action. Following the strike the recalcitrants
are formally charged with these violations. After a union hearing
in which the employees participate by counsel the union fines them
sums ranging from $20 to $100. Some of the fined members refuse
to pay the fines. In lieu of expelling these members for failure to
pay the fines (a course that was thought concededly open to the
union) the union sues to recover the fines by suit against the members in the state court. The employer, Allis-Chalmers, files a complaint against the union with the NLRB charging that the union's
suit against the non-striking members was conduct "to restrain or
expressly with the internal affairs of labor organizations. It contained
an elaborate "bill of rights" setting forth requirements for union elections, procedures and standards of procedural "due process" to be
accorded union members before they can be "fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined." Labor and Management Reporting
Act of 1959, SS101(a) (5), 73 Stat. 523.
25 See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARY. L. REV.
1049 (1951).

The proviso recognized the control over admission to and

expulsion from membership already allowed unions by existing court
decisions. As Cox points out, the courts worked out limitations on the
exercise of this power in much the same terms later included in the
"bill of rights" of the 1959 legislation (see note 24). See Cox, Internal
Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, LcH.
L. REv. 819, 835-36 (1960).
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coerce" employees in the exercise of their section 7 right to "refrain
from" concerted activities, and therefore was an "unfair labor
practice".
C. IN THE AmMnISTRATI

TBuNAL:

NLRB PROCEEDINGS

The trial examiner, and the majority of the NLRB which
affirmed his decision, 26 considered as crucial only the question
whether these particular fines were permissible as within the scope
of the "expulsion" proviso. The Board had previously ruled that
the proviso did not permit expulsion of members for every reason.
In Skura 7 and Wellman-Lord 28 the Board had refused to permit
either expulsion or fines where the union had penalized members
for resorting to the Board's processes. In Allis-Chalmers, the Board
found that expulsion would be justifiable as a penalty for crossing
picket lines, and upheld the imposition of fines as a lesser penalty.
No significance was given to the additional feature of attempted
court enforcement of the fines by the union. Allis-Chalmers appealed the Board decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
D. N THE CoURTs
In the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals: First Decision
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the NLRB.
Before the court of appeals panel the Allis-Chalmers case took
on a new focus. The company conceded that expulsion would have'
been justifiable by virtue of the proviso. But, it argued, fines enforceable by court action constituted "coercion" within the intent
of the section 8 (b) (1) (A). A unanimous panel analyzed the legislative history and found that this section was not designed by Congress to ban court-collected fines. It added that in any event no
section 7 right was violated by the fines, since upon entering a union,
"members must take not only the benefits but the burdens also....
Implicit in the section 7 right to organize is the duty, once that right
has been exercised, to support the organization." 29 The case was
thus resolved without reliance on the proviso.
26 Before the NLRB the Allis Chalmers case was known as Local 248,
UAW, 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964).
27 Local 138, IUOE, AFL-CIO, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
28 H. B. Roberts, 148 N.L.R.B. 674 (1964); enforced as modified, Roberts
v. N.L.R.B., 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
29 Unpublished opinion, No. 14853, 7th Cir., Sept. 13, 1965 (furnished by
courtesy of Judge Kiley).
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In the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals: Final Decision (en banc)
On the rehearing en banc the court withdrew the panel opinion
and reversed the NLRB, four to three.3 0 Three dissenting judges
each filed a separate opinion.
(1). Circuit Judge Knoch (majority opinion)
Writing for the majority, Judge Knoch accepted the issue as

framed in the panel opinion,"' and, recited the common ground of
the litigants.82 In the court's present view, wrote Judge Knoch,
"The statutes in question present no ambiguities whatsoever, and
therefore do not require recourse to legislative history for clarification."33 Section 7 specifically gave certain rights to employees;
to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, ... to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of

collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and... to
refrain from any or all of such activities.

To this "right to refrain" the 1947 statute made but one single exception: the provision of section 8(a) (3) permitting "an agreement
requiring membership in a labor union as a condition of employment." Section 8(b) (1) (A) made it an "unfair labor practice"
for a labor organization or its agents "to restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7."
The court conceded that the union was free to expel members
for violations of its rules. However, by section 7, "Congress has
seen fit ... to diminish the authority and power of the union to
police its members by coercion...." The union's "authority is based
on voluntary association rather than coercion"; its coercive potential
is only "fortified with the weapons Congress has deemed advisable,"
i.e. the power to expel a union member. Congress did not give
30

358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966).

whether a union which imposes fines upon its members for
crossing a picket line of the union and seeks to secure payment of the
fines by suing or by threat of suit is guilty of violating the prohibition,
in Section 8(b) (1) (A) .. .against union action restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of
the Act." Id. at 658.
"The parties agreed that generally employees have the right not to
strike and that the Union may expel its members for any reason
authorized by its rules, but that the Union may not demand the discharge of an employee or other adverse change of his employment
status except for non-payment of uniform initiation fee and dues."
Id. at 658.
Id. at 660.

31 "...

32

33

THEORY AND ENFORCEMENT OF UNION FINES

503

unions power to make "coercive threats to take away his wages by
14

imposition of fines.

8

The court cited;
expressed Congressional policy of protecting the union member
... [as being] particularly apt where, a sin the case before us,
membership is the result not of individual voluntary choice but
of the insertion of a union security provision in the contract under
which a substantial minority of the employees may have been
forced into membership.3 5
(2). Chief Judge Hastings (dissenting)
The three dissenting judges all concurred in the dissent of Chief
Judge Hastings, although Judges Kiley and Swygert added supplemental analyses of their own.
Chief Judge Hastings saw no infringement of section 7 rights
in the union's action here. In his view section 7 grants to an "employee" the right of self organization "and to refrain from concerted activties, including an economic strike." But he
cannot believe the Congress intended... [that] an emploiee who
is a union member [italics his] may claim the right of self-organization for collective bargaining purposes and at the same time claim
the right to belong to the labor organization on his own terms.
Once employees "elect to belong to a union... I find no prohibition
in section 7 to prevent a union from disciplining those members
who decline to honor an authorized strike."3 6 In this case there was
a true election to assume union membership: "the strikebreaking
employees had a choice." They renounced the alternative of assum34 The court noted that the fines here were confined to $20 to $100 in total

for each recalcitrant member, but added that the union constitution
provided for maximum fines of $100 for each crossing of the picket
line, which might have "run into thousands of dollars creating a far
greater burden on the working man than expulsion from his labor
organization or even loss of job." Id. at 658.
85 Id at 660. Judge Knoch then states as the accepted interpretation of
the union security provision (section 8 (a) (3)) that "such membership properly incurs an obligation to pay dues and fees but may not
be extended to include liability to submit to fines for indulging in a
protected activity." Id. The union conceded on argument before the
court that an employee who elected merely to comply with the minimum requirement of paying union dues (a condition of employment
under a union shop) might not be subjected to union fines. See Note,
8(b) (1) (a) Limitations Upon the Right of a Union to Fine Its Members, 115 U. PA. L. R-v. 47, 62 (1966).
86 Chief Judge Hastings here recalls that: "Ithas never been disputed
that a union may discipline its members for engaging in an unauthorized strike." He finds no "congressional purpose to distinguish between
wildcat strikers and strikebreakers." 358 F.2d at 662.

504

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 47, NO. 3 (1968)

ing the mere "dues-paying" membership required by the union shop
agreement, an alternative which would have left them (as the union
conceded) "beyond the reach of union discipline." Once an employee
chose "full membership" he incurred "obligations to his union as
the reciprocal counterpart of his rights within the organization."
In the 1947 legislation Congress placed only one limitation on the
power of the union to regulate its internal affairs. It was specifically enjoined from attempting to enforce its internal regulations
by affecting the members' employment status.3 7
Congress did not address the prohibition in 8(b) (1) (A) of
the 1947 Act "to intra-union regulation but rather to coercive acts
of violence, intimidation or job discrimination." Judge Hastings
found (and here he cited both excerpts from the 1947 legislative history and the text of the 1959 Act) that the fines against dissident
members was not the "type of restraint or coercion proscribed as
an unfair labor practice in Section 8 (b) (1) (A).,s
In an apparent dependence on the "expulsion" proviso of
8 (b) (1) (A) 39 (and perhaps on the provisions of the 1959 Act) ,40
Judge Hastings further concluded that the "... imposition of the
fines in question are not only free from proscribed restraint and
coercion but are within the protected area of permissible internal
'41
union regulation."
(3). Kiley, Cir. J. (dissenting)
Judge Kiley, who had written the prevailing opinion for the
three-judge panel, found three distinct series of objections to the
37

38

39

40
41

To buttress his conclusion that Section 7 had not been violated, Chief
Judge Hastings cited the explicit provisions of the 1959 statute (which
had placed strong procedural safeguards upon the conduct of internal
union business affecting individual members): "That nothing herein
shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt
and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member
toward the institution . . . ." (Section 101 (a) (2) 73 Stat. 522), and
that a union has a right "to discipline by fine, suspension and expulsion." (Section 101 (a) (5) 73 Stat. 523).
The opinion here recalled N.L.R.B. v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.S.
274 (1960), a 7th Circuit decision on upholding a union's threat to
withhold insurance coverage from members who had refused to pay
disciplinary fines. 358 F.2d at 664.
"[T] his paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization
to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership therein." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
See Note 24 supra.
358 F.2d at 665. The opinion here argued that unions should "in all
fairness" be given "the same freedom of internal contror' of its business affairs as employers enjoy "as a proper prerogative of management."
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present majority's decision that imposition and court enforcement
of fines was an "unfair labor practice."
(1) He read the legislative history of the 1947 Act 42 as evidencing that section 8 (b) (1) (A) ("with or without the acquisition or
retention of membership proviso") was directed against "... specific
evils of force, violence, and threats thereof, mass picketing, and economic reprisals in the form of inducing an employer to discriminate
against an employee in his job rights ... [and not to] fines collectible by legal process."
(2) He stressed that in the case as presented by the parties
there had been no issue of "non-voluntariness" of the union membership.43 The union constitution made specific provision for a mere
dues-paying status; and the union itself had conceded that ".... if the
men before us had no obligation to the union beyond paying dues
and fees, they would not be subject to the union 'requirement of
obedience to the common cause'....,44
(3) Judge Kiley insisted that the majority opinion implied irrationality (in the-sense of incoherence and inconsistency) in the labor
legislation under consideration. "A union member may express
agreement or disagreement with union rules or policies, but he
cannot simultaneously be a member and also have whatever advantages there might be in non-membership .... ,,45 "We have not been
persuaded... [he concluded], that this absurdity was in the contemplation of Congress." 46 Furthermore, in the 1959 legislation Congress had specifically recognized that "[A] union is a form of industrial government and the rights and duties of a member are similar
to those of citizens in a democratic society." 47 Judge Kiley argued
that Congress "would have been inconsistent... [in the 1959 Act if
42

43

Judge Kiley rejected the majoritys suggestion that "the statutes in
question present no ambiguities whatsoever," citing the Supreme
Court's statement in N.L.R.B. v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.S. 274
(1960), that "restrain or coerce" in section 8 (b) were non-specific, indeed vague words." 358 F.2d at 670.
The majority opinion had stated that "[I]n the case before us, membership is the result not of individual voluntary choice but of the insertion of a union security provision in the contract under which a
substantial minority of the employees may have been forced into membership." 358 F.2d at 660.
Id. at 669.

44
45 Id.

at 667.
46 Id. at 668.
47

The 1959 act, after enumerating a "bill of rights" of union members,
specified that "nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right
of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to
the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an
institution."
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it had been already (in section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the 1947 Act) ] forbidden unions to fine members who cross picket lines, for what greater
responsibility could a union member have to the union as an insti48
tution than to support a lawful strike called by the majority?
He countered the majority's assertion that a union has only such
powers as are affirmatively granted it by statute ("that unions,
as associations of men, had no rightful prestatute existence") 49 with
the Supreme Court's holding that "[t]he Constitution presupposes
and gives protection to the right of association." 50 The majority's
dictum that unions were largely the creatures of statute merely
connotes "that the Wagner [1935] Act and subsequent legislation
gave unions status as institutions." Congress' recognition of the
employees "right to organize" implicitly recognized "the duty, once
that right has been exercised, to support the organization":
It would be difficult to accept the proposition that a union should
be the one secular society in our nation which one may enter without being bound by majority rule and without submision to some
limitations on rights for the the common good. 1
(4). Swygart, Cir. J. (dissenting)
In his dissent, Judge Swygert dwelt chiefly upon three contentions of the majority: (1) that "this case involves employees who
are involuntary members of the union"; (2) that a union victory
here would lead to "the possibility that the union might exact crippling and unreasonable fines"; and (3) that "there is no occasion
for resorting to legislative history" in applying sections 7 and
8 (b) (1) (A) to the facts of this case.
Even if legislative history were ignored, "a mechanical application of the statute" does not provide an answer to the problem in
this case. Judge Swygert here returns to Judge Kiley's suggestion
of the inconsistency in saying that "a union member may make an
independent, ad hoc determination to cross a union-imposed picket
line without subjecting himself to reasonable internal discipline."
This is simply to say "that an employee-member may simultaneously
engage in protected activity and refrain from [so] engaging." He
then brings the majority's handling of the "retention of membership" proviso of Section 8(b) (1) (A) to rational inquiry. This
provision had been introduced into the statute to satisfy those legis48

358 F.2d at 667.

49

The precise statement of Judge Knoch was: "An analogy was drawn
between an industrial union and a democratic society where the majority vote rules, forgetting that a union is largely the creation of

statute. ... " 358 F.2d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 1967).
50 N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
51 358 F.2d 656, 668 (7th Cir. 1967).
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lators who wanted reassurance that the full section would not be
applied to internal union affairs. To limit the union's disciplinary
action under the proviso to expulsion and not to include a power
to impose fines is "not only to make undue restriction of the words
'retention of membership' but also to apply the proviso in a way not
intended and which diminishes a power which would exist entirely
apart from the proviso." For Judge Swygert concludes, like his
co-dissenters, that:
Section 8(b) (1) (A) by its terms is directed at union conduct vis-a52
vis employees, not at union conduct vis-a-vis union members.
In the United States Supreme Cour 5 3
(1) Brennan, J. (Prevailingopinion)
Justice Brennan cites the "extraordinary results" which a "literal interpretation" stripping unions of the power to fine members
for strikebreaking (and to enforce the fines by court action) would
visit upon "a coherent national labor policy." This policy "extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own relations
with his employer and creates in the union a power to act in the
interests of all employees":
Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with
powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to
create and restrict the rights of those whom he represents... .54
Integral to this federal labor policy has been the power in the
chosen union to protect against erosion its status under that policy
through reasonable discipline of members who violate rules and
regulations governing membership. That power is particularly vital
when members engage in strikes. Provisions in union constitutions
and by-laws for fines and expulsion of recalcitrants, including
strikebreakers, are therefore commonplace and were commonplace
at the time of the Taft-Hartley 1947 amendments. 55
To read the statutory language "literally" in the sense of the
court below would attribute to Congress an even more pervasive
regulation of internal affairs of unions in 1947 than those effected in
1959 by the Landrum-Griffin amendments, 56 "an intent at war with
the understanding of the union-membership relation which has been
at the heart of its [Congress'] effort 'to fashion a coherent labor
policy' "; namely to imply a design to limit unions "in the powers
necessary to the discharge of their role as exclusive statutory agents
52 Id. at 672.
53 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
54 Id. at 180.
55 Id. at 181-82.
56 See note 24 supra.
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by impairing the usefulness of labor's cherished strike weapon." In
the latter connection Justice Brennan agrees that expulsion may be
an adequate, and more severe, weapon than fines in the hands of a
strong union. But without an effective power to fine recalcitrants,
a weak union "faced with further depletion of its ranks may have
no real choice except to condone the member's disobedience."
Before accepting a literal interpretation of language which leads to
such results "we should determine whether this meaning is confirmed in the legislative history of the section."
After an unusually full and candid resume of the legislative
history of Section 8(b) (1) (A) Justice Brennan concludes that
(even apart from the "membership" proviso) there is not one word
directing the application of the "coerce or restrict" language in the
body of that section to internal union affairs, and a number of
assurances by sponsors of the amendment to the contrary. In addition, Justice Brennan finds in the "membership" proviso "cogent
support" for his conclusion that the body of 8 (b) (1) (A) does not
reach "the imposition of fines and attempts at court enforcement."
He concludes: (1) the proviso "at the very least" preserves the right
of unions to impose those fines which carry "the explicit or implicit
threat of expulsion for non-payment"; (2) therefore, "the rule in the
UAW constitution governing fines is valid and the fines themselves
and expulsion for nonpayment would not be an unfair labor
practice."
But what justification is given for the court enforcement of the
fines? Here Justice Brennan finds it unnecessary to reach the qusetion whether the proviso can be read "to authorize court enforcement of fines." It is enough that there is no design in the body of
8 (b) (1) (A) to ban the imposition of fines. 57 Justice Brennan suggests two "anomalies" which he finds in making a distinction
between court enforcement of fines and expulsion. (1) Congress in
1947 "was operating within the context of the 'contract theory' of
the union-member relationship which prevailed widely at that
time." But a contract is made efficacious precisely by its legal
enforceability by lawsuits. (2) A distinction admitting expulsion
and banning court-enforced fines would bear more severely upon
the members of a strong union, and impair the bargaining facility
of a weak union.
Justice Brennan reinforces his conclusion that the court below
had over-extended the reach of 8(b) (1) (A) by reference to the
57

To detect such a design to ban would be to attribute to Congress a
particular concern "in banning court enforcement of such fines." Yet
"there is not one word of the legislative history evidencing such congressional concern."
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provisions of the 1959 legislation.58 He cites its provisions specifically
permitting membership fines, and disclaiming any intent to impair
the right of any labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable
rules as to "the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution." Why should Justice Brennan find significance in this later act for the interpretation of the 1947 act?
"To be sure, what Congress did in 1959 does not establish what
it meant in 1947. However, as another major step in an evolving pattern of regulation of union conduct, the 1959 Act is a relevant consideration." Congress' respect in 1959 for union rights re fines and
internal regulations is to be viewed as consistent with, and not contradictory of, the earlier legislation. In the absence of a clear disclaimer, like Judge Kiley, Justice Brennan sees need to construe
the total national labor legislation as a coherent corpus.
From his examination of the legislative history Justice Brennan concludes that the 1947 prohibitions against "restrain or coercion" of an employee (Section 8 (b) (1) (A) does not include "a
prohibition against the imposition of fines on members who decline
to honor an authorized strike and against attempts to collect such
fines."
Having (1) found need to consult the legislative history, and
(2) concluded from the history that the 1947 Act did not brand the
union action per se coercive, in the third part of his opinion Justice
Brennan considers the question of "voluntariness" of membership
in the context of this case. Noting that Allis-Chalmers' collective
bargaining agreements with the respondent local unions incorporated union security clauses, Justice Brennan seems to accept the
distinction between "full" membership entailing subjection to union
discipline, and mere "dues paying" membership. 9 He takes the
evidence in this case as conclusive that the members concerned had
by their actions become members for all purposes. But Justice
Brennan reads the opinion of the majority en banc below as contending that even full membership in many cases is the result not
of "individual voluntary choice but of the insertion of a union
security provision in the contract. ... " He reads this contention as
suggesting that the union members' freedom in adopting full membership was in fact illusory, for "a substantial minority of the employees may have been forced into membership." Justice Brennan
rejects the relevance of this supposed "fact" to these proceedings, for
(1) "... the relevant inquiry here is not what motivated a member's
full membership but whether the Taft-Hartley [1947] amendments
58 See note 24 supra.
59 See Note, "8(b) (1) (A) Limitations Upon the Right of a Union to

Fine Its Members," 115 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 62 (1966).
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prohibited disciplinary measures against a full member who crossed
his union's picket line." (2) "It is clear that the fined employees in
' 60
these cases enjoyed full union membership.
(2). White, J. (concurring opinion)
In a terse concurring opinion which supplied the swing vote in
the Court's 5-4 decision, Mr. Justice White found the proviso decisive. He found it unnecessary to pass upon the question whether a
union member had a right protected by Section 7 to cross the union's
picket lines after declaration of an authorized strike. He therefore
did not deal with the distinction between "full membership" and
"mere dues-paying membership." His starting point was that Section 8(b) (1) (A) -- except as limited by the "acquisition and retention of membership" proviso-made it an unfair labor practice
for a union to coerce or restrain employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights. He claimed that the majority and dissent agreed both
on "the validity of the union rule against its members crossing
picket lines during a properly called strike," and on the propriety
of expulsion to enforce the rule. Although this union rule was
"coercive" and "in derogation of Section 7 rights," it was "enforceable at least by expulsion" solely because of the proviso. But was
the proviso broad enough to justify the union's resort to court enforcement of fines for violation of the rule? His answer to this
question was an unargued "Yes."
In Justice White's view the dissent questions whether fines for
violation of union rules are enforceable at all-either by expulsion
or by court enforcement-but finds that court enforcement "at least"
is an unfair labor practice because "more coercive" than fines internally collected. He notes that Justice Brennan's opinion regards
enforcement of fines by court action as less coercive than enforcement by expulsion and finds "no basis for thinking that Congress...
intended to bar enforcement by this less coercive method." On
Justice White's agreement with this point he bases his crucial vote.
(3). Black, J. (dissenting opinion)
Justice Black's dissent first considers the basis for the Court's
holding with respect to the body of 8 (b) (1) (A), i.e. entirely apart
from the proviso. He subsequently deals with the Court's reliance
upon the proviso.
60 Somewhat oddly, the opinion viewed as "not before us," and would
"intimate no view on," the question whether the Taft-Hartley [1947]
prohibitions would apply if the unions had applied fines to "mere
dues paying members."
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Justice Black doubts that the words "restrain or coerce" are
sufficiently ambiguous to justify resort to legislative history. But
he does not disagree with the "three significant things" which the
Court found in this history: (1) "not a single word" to indicate
8(b) (1) (A) was intended to apply to "traditional internal union
discipline in general, or disciplinary fines in particular"; (2) the
"repeated refrain" in the debates that Congress did not intend to
place limits on the "internal affairs of unions"; (3) that senatorial
supporters of 8(b) (1) (A) were chiefly concerned with "union
coercion during organizational drives" and with "union violence in
general." To Justice Black these "three observations about the legislative history of 8(b) (1) (A) do not justify "disregarding the
plain meaning of the section." He goes further: "It seems perfectly
clear to me that the Court does not think so either."61 Black cannot
agree with "the Court's unarticulated premise that the Court has
power to add a new weapon to the union's economic arsenal....
That is a job for Congress, not this Court."
Justice Black then deals with three assumptions of the Court
with respect to the "retention of membership" proviso to 8(b) (1)
(A):
Assumption No. 2: that the proviso "at the very least" permits
permits the union to expel members "for the express purpose of discouraging them from going to work." Black: "I am not at all sure"
that the union may do this by a fine for breach of a union rule
"even though the fine is only enforceable by expulsion from membership."
Assumption No. 2: that the proviso "at the very least" permits
the union to impose fines (as a lesser remedy than expulsion).
Black: "Contrary to the court I am not at all certain" that a union's
right to make rules for the retention of membership "includes the
right to restrain a member from working." And Justice Black's
reservation applies "even though the fine is only enforceable by
expulsion from membership."
Assumption No. 3: the Court's ultimate holding "that Congress
could not have meant to preclude unions from the alternative of
judicially enforcing fines." Black: Even if we assume arguendo that
the first two assumptions are correct "the fundamental error of the
Court's opinion is its failure to recognize the practical and theoretical difference between a court-enforced fine, as here, and a fine
enforced by expulsion or less drastic intra-union means." It is not
61 "The real reason for the court's decision is its policy judgment that
unions, especially weak ones, need the power to impose fines on strikebreakers and to enforce those fines in court." 388 U.S. 175, 201 (1967).
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realistic merely to say that the fines here were minimal, for "it is
not difficult to imagine a case where they will be so large that the
threat of their imposition will absolutely restrain employees from
going to work during a strike." The distinction between fines
enforceable merely by internal means and fines enforceable by
court action is glaring in such a case, for
Although an employee might be willing to work even if it meant
the loss of union membership, he would have to be well paid indeed
to work at the risk that he would have to pay his union $100 a
day for each day worked. 62

Justice Black next deals with the effort of the Court to bring
"reasonable court-enforced fines within the ambit of 'internal union
affairs.'" He assails the Court's notion that once internal union
fines are upheld the allowance of "court-enforcement of fines"
necessarily follows as a consequence of the "contract theory" of the
union-member relationship. This contention, he says, has no basis
in history, or in logic. Even the Court's authorities fail to suggest
that court-enforced fines were "commonplace or traditional in 1947."
In fact, "until recently unions rarely resorted to court-enforcement
of fines." The Court's purported justification of court-enforcement
of fines by analogy to judicial enforcement of an ordinary commercial contract "is simply 'a legal fabrication.' "63
The contractual theory of union membership, at least until recently,
was a fiction used by the courts to justify judicial intervention
into
64
union affairs to protect employees, not to help unions.
Justice Black "cannot believe" the Court's suggestion that Congress
"intended the effectiveness of 8 (b) (1) (A) to be impaired by such
fiction."
In the final sections of his dissent, Mr. Justice Black rejects the
Court's displacement of "the plain meaning" of 8(b) (1) (A) on
the basis of "the inconclusive legislative history it points to,"66 and
62
63

Id. at 204.
Id. at 207. Justice Black borrows this phrase from Summers, upon
whom the Court had greatly relied: "The contract of membership
is... a legal fabrication.... What are the terms of the contract? The
constitutional provisions, particularly those governing discipline, are
so notoriously vague that they fall short of the certainty ordinarily
required of a contract. The member has no choice as to terms but is
compelled to adhere to the inflexible ones presented. Even then, the
union is not bound, for it retains the unlimited power to amend any
terms at any time.... In short, membership is a special relationship.

It is as far removed from the main channel of contract law as the relationship created by marriage...." Summers, LWcA LnVn'TA3ONS ON
UNION DIscIPLINE, 64 HARv.L.
64
65

388 U.S. 175, 207 (1967).
Id. at 208.

REV.

1049, 1055-56 (1951).
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he calls unrealistic the Court's distinction between "full" and "mere
dues-paying membership." He reaffirms his view that Congress'
policy in Sections 7 and 8 (of the 1947 legislation) was "to leave
workers wholly free to determine in what concerted labor activities
they will engage or decline to engage." To Justice Black the Court
has here striven diligently "to defeat this unequivocally declared
purpose of Congress." And it has done so "merely because the
Court believes that too much freedom of choice for workers will
impair the effective power of unions." In his view the Court "has
ignored the literal language of 8 (b) (1) (A) in order to give unions
a power which the Court, but not Congress, thinks they need."
Four distinct sets of questions with respect to the 1947 amendments were thus raised by the various opinions.
1. Did the new (1947) Section 7(a) "right to refrain" apply to
those employees who had joined a union, in the sense that they
too were free to oppose by conduct the membership's decision to
strike?
2. (a) Was the anti-coercion clause of Section 8 (b) (1) (A)
violated by imposition of internal fines upon members for opposition that took the form of crossing their union's picket lines? (b) If
not, did resort to the external forum of the courts to collect these
fines constitute the prohibited "coercion"?
3. (a) Even if these clauses of 7 (a) and 8 (b) (1) (A) read alone
would constitute prohibited "coercion" from exercising a "right to
refrain," was the union's internal assessment of such fines saved by
the "acquisition or retention of membership proviso" [to 8 (b) (1)
(A)]? (b) Was the union's resort to court collection similarly
protected?
4. (a) Should the answers to these three question be different
in a "union shop" situation, that is, where membership in the union
elected as bargaining agent was a condition of retaining employment? (b) If so, was a relevant distinction to be made here between
"members" who merely paid union dues (the minimum required by
8 (b) (3) and those who availed themselves of "full membership
participation and privileges?
We now summarize the answers given to these four questions
in the various opinions:
A. In the NLRB: Only question 3(a) was explicitly considered.
The fines, which were viewed as "internal" lesser penalties than
expulsion, were implicitly included within right to expel and "excepted" from the "coerce" clause by the explicit terms of the "membership" Proviso. Court enforcement was not viewed as a separate
problem.
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B. In the Court of Appeals: Majority (Knoch, Cir. J.): A "Yes"
answer to questions 1 and 2(a), was dictated by the plain language
of the 1947 legislation itself. Judge Knoch found additional support
for the court's conclusion in a "compulsory membership" situation
(cf. question 4(a)).
Dissents: Hastings,C. J. Answered "No" to questions 1 and 2 (a)
(showing no interest in 2(b)). He found a "Yes" answer to 3(a)
easy, but unnecessary (and no interest in 3 (b) or 4).
Kiley, Cir. J. stressed a "No" to questions 2 (a) and (b) and
3 (a) and (b) ("lesser discipline of fines") and a resounding "Yes"
to 4 (b).
Swygert, Cir. J. found a clear "No" in the legislative history
for questions 1 and 2 (a), and a "Yes" to 3 (a).
And so, neither in the NLRB nor in the Court of Appeals was
any interest shown (save for a brief reference by Judge Kiley) in
2 (b) or 3 (b), these special question raised by court-enforcement of
the fines.
C. In the Supreme Court:
Majority (Brennan,J.):
1.
No.
2(a). No (not applicable to internal union affairs, and so not
to fines).
(b). No (implicit in "contract" theory).
3(a). Qualified yes-(at least where fines carried threat of expulsion)-and as "lesser penalty" than expulsion.
(b). Yes (Because even if proviso did not authorize court
enforcement, neither did it forbid it).
4(a). (b). Although he refuses to say a different decision would
be reached if less than 'Tull" (i.e., mere "dues-paying")
membership were involved, Justice Brennan stresses that
"the fined members in these cases enjoyed full union membership."
White, J., (concurring):

1.
2(a).
3(a).
4(a).

Yes.
Yes.
Yes; (b) yes.
No; (b) no interest.

Dissent (Black, J.):

1.
2(a).
3(a).
(b).
4. (a)

Yes.
Yes.
No.
No (a fortiori), but court enforcement is more severe.
No (but Justice Black finds the result "particularly" offensive in a union shop situation, and judicial enforcement
obviously unavailable where recalcitrants are not "full
members" of the union).
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We shall now look at the opinions in the perspective of their
authors' views of the fundamentals of the union-membership relation, and of judicial method.
1. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals en banc
(a) Majority opinion (Judge Knoch)
(i) Union-membership relation.
To Judge Knoch the union is "primarily the creature of statute." It has only those powers expressly given it by statute: Congress did give the union (in the proviso) the power to enforce
internal rules by expulsion; Congress did not give it the power to
enforce them by fines. Therefore the union did not have powel to
fine recalcitrant members. The powers given by Congress must
themselves be particularly narrowly scrutinized in a situation where
a union is the beneficiary of the support of a union security provision in the collective bargaining contract. For this undercut, the
"voluntary" ingredient that is essential in the union-member relation. Judge Knoch does not specifically refer to the "contract"
theory of association but it is implicit in his argumentation.
(ii) Judicial method.
This opinion is replete with expressions of policy preferences
which we do not trouble to repeat. Judge Knoch is reluctant to
resort to legislative history when the "plain meaning" of the statutory words have "no ambiguities whatsoever" and, incidentally, are
in accord with the generalized policies which he finds congenial to
Congress and to the Court. The underlying philosophy of Judge
Knoch's judicial methodology may be characterized as "positivist,"
"voluntarist" and "nominalist". The limitations on individual action
are restricted to those specifically set out in the statute; the statutory
language is to be taken "as is" without any judicial responsibility
to evaluate it in the light of an assumed rationality or coherence of
law itself, or of legislative intent differently discovered; the union
is a collection of discrete individuals except as specific legislative
language has clothed the group with specific ingredients of collective
power.
(b) Dissent (Chief Judge Hastings)
(i) Union-membership relation.
Unlike the majority, Chief Judge Hastings views the union as
a social group with "disciplinary" power; it is in receipt of obligations from its members which are the counterpart of their "rights."
He finds here no violation of Section 7 rights, because these rights
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(e.g. not to take part in concerted activities) are not absolute, but
must be considered in the context of the obligations undertaken by
members incident to joining the union as a social group. This view
assumes that ordinary disciplinary power is possessed by the institutional group unless it is specifically withdrawn by the legislator.
The sole limitation placed by Congress with respect to union discipline enforcing its membership rules is that it should not affect
the members' employment status [8 (b) (3)]. There is no objection
in statute or in law, then, to union enforcement of its rules by fines,
even fines enforced by court action. The aspect of voluntariness of
membership is sufficiently satisfied when the employee elects to
take "full" membership in the union, as distinguished from the
mere "dues paying" membership which is imposed upon him by
statute as a condition of the union security clause in the collective
bargaining agreement. Judge Hastings considers the union as a
species of the type social institution: Broad freedom is given business corporation management in the conduct of internal affairs; comparable freedom (clear statutory language apart) is likewise an
incident of the powers of a labor union as a social organization.
(ii) Judicial method.
Chief Judge Hastings uses an analytical rather than a legislative history approach to the statutory language. This entails consideration of the full array of choices (or "rights") provided by Section 7 of the Act-the right to organize and to engage in concerted
activities as well as the right to refrain from such activities. The
only limitation, he reasons, which Congress has placed on this range
of choice is the permissive clause permitting the union security
arrangement. 66 But, without using language of "waiver," Judge
Hastings conceives that an employee choosing the alternative of
entering (with "full membership") a labor organization must bear
consequences of this choice: "an ensuing obligation of union solidarity."
This normal consequence of the concept of "membership" in
an organization must, he argues, follow unless Congress has indicated a design to depart from it. He does not find in the statute any
general design of Congress to deal with "internal union affairs,"
much less a specific intent "to interfere with or prohibit the right
of the union to discipline its members for the violation of reasonable rules."
66

"... except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in section 158 (a) (3) of this title." 29
U.S.C.A. § 157.
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Thus, given a voluntary adherence in a labor organization
founded for a given purpose, rational construction of a statute affecting it requires that the legislature be assumed to have contemplated
that the labor organization has an inherent power "to discipline
its members for the violation of reasonable rules or policies it could
legitimately expect its members to observe." This analysis borders
remarkably closely on Hauriou's theory of the institution. Judge
Hastings' judicial method not only presupposes a theory of a social
organization which imposes internal obligations on members, but
it presupposes that Congress has acted in support of "the right to
self-organization" with such a theory in mind.
Even if such a theory of institution be accepted, the question
remains whether or not it solves the central problem in this case:
Does court enforcement of fines constitute an aspect of "internal
affairs" of the union? Is it not "external" to the union and "internal"
only with respect to the over-all political society? This question,
which was not faced up to by Judge Hastings, is put aside for later
consideration after our present scrutiny of the various judicial
opinions.

(c) Dissent (Judge Kiley)
(i) Union-membership relation.
More explicitly dealing with theoretical notions, but essentially
proceeding along the same lines as Chief Judge Hastings, Judge
Kiley accepts an institutional notion of social organization as applicable to the government of a "democratic society," both public and
private, and specifically to a labor union. Men may not enter a
"secular society in our nation without being bound by majority

rule and without submission to some limitation on rights for the
common good."
(ii) Judicial method.
Judge Kiley takes the above view of the union-membership
relation as the premise for the congressional amendments of 1947.
He finds nothing in the legislative history to qualify this view with
respect to labor unions, and he finds explicit support for the premise
in the provisions of the 1959 legislation. 67
Like Chief Judge Hastings he proceeds from this institutional
premise, without further discussion, to the conclusion that the 1947
legislation left intact the union's right, as an aspect of its internal
affairs, to have its punitive "fines collectible by legal process."
67

"That nothing herein shall impair the right of a labor organization to
adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every
member toward the organization as an institution .
" 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 411 (a) (2).
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(d) Dissent (Judge Swygert)

(i) Union-membership relation.
Like his co-dissenters Judge Swygert stresses what voluntarily
joining a union (that is, taking "full membership" in "exercise of
his Section 7 rights") legally entails. The consequence of an employee's voluntarily associating himself with a union (and Judge
Swygert sees "no issue in this case concerning compulsory union
membership") is that he "may not join on his own terms, abiding
only by those rules with which he is in personal agreement." On
the contrary, he thereby subjects himself to "reasonable internal
union discipline."
(ii) Judicial method.
Judge Swygert, like Chief Judge Hastings, uses an analytical
approach to the "rights" enumerated in Section 7. It is unreasonable
to attribute to Congress the notion that "an employee-member may
simultaneously engage in protected activity and refrain from so
engaging." He therefore concludes that Section 8 (b) (1) (A) "by
its terms is directed at union conduct vis-a-vis employees, not at
union conduct vis-a-vis union members." Like his co-dissenters,
however, Judge Swygert finds a premise that Congress had elected
in 1947 to leave conduct of internalunion affairs to the unions themselves; and he makes no specific attempt to justify court collection
of fines as a necessary corollary of this premise.
2. The United States Supreme Court
(a) Majority opinion (Mr. Justice Brennan)
(i) Union-membership relation.
The interweaving references in Justice Brennan's opinion to
union "self-government," "internal affairs of unions" and the "contract theory" of the union-member relationship may most satisfactorily be resolved in this way: Justice Brennan three times refers
to the "contract theory" as being presupposed by both Congress and
the courts in 1947, when the Taft-Hartley amendments were passed.
His emphasis on the words "at that time" (i.e. 1947), and the
repeated references to union self-government, internal affairs of
unions, and citation of the 1959 Landrum-Griffin "organization as an
institution" provision, 68 suggest that both Congress and the Court
have swung over to an institutional conception of the union-membership relation.
Yet Justice Brennan makes use of the "contract theory" to rationalize what proved to be the key aspect of the case as developed
68 See note 67 supra.

THEORY AND ENFORCEMENT OF UNION FINES

519

in the Supreme Court: whether "court-enforcement" of union fines
was a legitimate aspect of "internal union affairs." His reference to
the "contract theory" as the dominant theory in 1947 is designed
to test Congress' intent with respect to the scope of its words
"restrain or coerce" in 8 (b) (1) (A). Did Congress intend to ban
court enforcement of fines? He was unwilling to attribute to Congress "a narrow and discrete interest in banning court enforcement
of such fines" for "[t]he efficacy of a contract [i.e. of union membership] is precisely its legal enforcement. A lawsuit is and has
been the ordinary way by which performance of private money obligations is compelled." Again, while he could not assert that court
enforcement of fines was customary at the time of the Taft-Hartley
amendments, Justice Brennan sought to bolster his argument that
the 1947 legislation harbored no intent to bar them by citing (1) the
then prevalent custom of internal union fines, plus (2) the general
jurisprudential notion that "this contractual conception of the relation between a member and his union widely prevails in this country."'69 We shall later question the persuasive power of this
argument.
May we not conclude that Mr. Justice Brennan regards an "institutional" concept of the union-member relationship as controlling
today both in the legislation and in, at least, his court. He finds that
the decision of the court below would wreak "extraordinary results"
upon the institutional aspects of the "coherent national labor policy."
Integral to this federal labor policy has been the power in the
chosen union to protect against erosion its status under that policy
through reasonable discipline of members who violate rules and
regulations governing membership.70

(ii) Judicial method.
Treating the national labor policy as a coherent whole, and
measuring a given discrete textual interpretation by the consequences it would have for that policy, Justice Brennan found it
necessary to consult the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
amendments. This history, he concedes, does not specifically authorize court enforcement of fines. But more significantly, to him,
neither does any language or evident intent forbid court enforcement. And he upholds such court enforcement as an obvious aspect
69 The court quotes this statement from Machinists v. Gonzalez, 356 U.S.
617, 618 (1958). Justice Brennan faces up to the contention that fines
and expulsions under union constitutions in 1947 "did not explicitly
call for court enforcement." He answered this objection: "However,
the potentiality of resort to courts for enforcement is implicit in any
binding obligation." 388 U.S. 175, 182 (1967).
70 Id. at 181.
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of the internal affairs of unions, management of which Congress was
careful to leave, in 1947, to the unions themselves.
The key to Justice Brennan's mode of interpretation is the
search for the dominant policy of the relevant body of legislation;
the pertinent statutory language is considered in the light of what
he conceives as that policy-at least to the extent of forcing a careful examination of statutory history to see if Congress clearly
intended to depart in some significant regard from the "coherent
national labor policy." More important, perhaps, for our present
interest, Justice Brennan resolves that the labor "institution" has
been established. He reads the labor statutes together as integral
whole (as one must in his view), and this reading connotes certain
implied disciplinary powers developed by custom and rationally
inferrable-unless Congress has explicitly restricted them in some
specific way.
(b) Dissenting opinion (Mr. Justice Black)
(i) Union-membership relation.
Mr. Justice Black's penetrating opinion presents a view of the
union-membership relation similar to that advanced by the majority
opinion below. The union is a creature of statute whose total power
and arsenal of weapons against its members is constituted in powers
specifically given it by Congress, and not in implications drawn by
the Court from the "nature" of the labor institution.
(ii) Judicial method.
Justice Black's positivist and analytical approach finds him unwilling to consciously propose theories of his own. But he is swift to
pounce on theoretical bases that others tender to justify what he
deems "policy" results. Referring to Justice Brennan's odd employment of the quondam "contract theory" of the union membership
relationship, 71 Black cites (only dialectically, it seems) the clear
"institutional" statement of Summers that "membership is a special relationship.., as far removed from the main channel of con' 72
tract law as the relationship caused by marriage.
3. The Holding of the Allis-Chalmers case
Surely Mr. Justice Black is correct that the Court's decision in
Alli-Chalmers is not entailed by the reasons given for it by Mr.
71
72

Which Justice Black denounces as a "legal fabrication." See note 61
supra.
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HAiv. L. REv.
1049, 1056 (1951).
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Justice Brennan. Surely the outcome-approval of court enforcement of union fines-was not expressly provided by Congress in
1947, nor impliedly intended (whatever that may mean) as a continuation of an already accepted practice, nor as a logical consequence of legal arrangements familiar in the area of commercial
contracts, i.e., enforcement by suit. By 1947 the union had already
been launched as a social institution, and protected by the 1935
legislation. The 1947 legislation gave clear recognition to this fact;
and ample legislative history was reviewed by the Court to affirm
that unions had been left to manage their internal affairs prior to
1947, and that the Taft-Hartley amendments had left unchanged this
internal direction including the union's right to make internal disciplinary arrangements. This existing "right" of the union as an
institution to manage its internal affairs was not impaired by the
1959 amendments, save as to the specific procedural guarantees with
which the 1959 legislation was concerned. All these points were
made by the Court in Allis-Chalmers. The incompleteness of the
Court's analysis lay in its attempt to resurrect (and misapply) an
outdated "contract theory" of the union-membership relation to
support the union's resort to "court enforcement."
IV. HAURIOU'S APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF
ALLIS-CHALMERS v. NLRB
We have considered the various opinions in Allis-Chalmers in
great detail because the problem presented by that case, and by
the various judicial attempts to solve it, affords a micrososm for testing the applicability to a private group of Hauriou's institutional
theory of law and judicial methodology. We shall now examine the
results which his analysis would yield in this case. What help would
it be in criticizing what was done by the Court, in putting the true
issues in focus, in furnishing criteria for dealing with aspects of
policy, and in evaluating the effectiveness of other approaches to
the solution of the problem presented?
A. CRmcisM OF WHAT WAS DoNE BY THE CouRT

Justice Brennan's technique for justifying the court enforcement of union fines, as we have seen, was to postulate a "contract"
theory of labor association and then to assimilate the resort to courts
for enforcement of fines to the ordinary process of an action for
money damages for breach of contract. On Hauriou's analysis the
rules within a group that bear upon the governmental aspects of
the group's internal life (Themis), are of a radically different type
from the rules founded in human sociability (Dike) 7s3 which are
73

See note 6 supra.
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well exemplified by commercial contracts and their enforcement by
courts in an action between the two units who are parties to the
contract. Different considerations are raised when a court (external
to the group) 74 is called upon to enforce a Themis-founded (intragroup) claim than when it settles a commercial dispute between
two parties who stand before the court as independent member units
of the external state society of which the enforcing court is an organ.
This distinction does not solve this case, but it raises the question
whether Justice Brennan has blurred a consideration of some
moment.
In his opinion, Justice Brennan took pains to stress that the
national labor legislation (including the 1959 legislation,7 5 which
followed by some 12 years the date of enactment of the specific
statutory provisions under consideration) 7 should be interpreted as
a coherent whole. Ilauriou's development view of legal ideas would
have been hospitable to this avowed approach of Justice Brennan.
Hauriou would have applied it so far as to invoke the concept of
the labor union as an "institution" (which Justice Brennan seemed
to agree was the present-day view) rather than to resurrect an
assumed (and dated) theory of "contract" as a basis for justifying
court collection of the fines. The inconsistency of Justice Brennan
here puts one on notice that legal theory is being employed by him
to screen an inarticulate policy determination by the court.
On the other hand, Hauriou would note in Justice Black's dissent an a priori assumption: that the union had only such powers
as were specifically ascripted to it by statutory language, without
consideration of general legal policy of the national society or without entertaining the possibility of a residual power in a group to
discipline its members. This was, of course, the product of a particular general theory of law.

B. PUTTMNG TH "TRUE" IssuEs IN Focus
Hauriou would stress the fundamental analytical distinction
between the union's disciplinary power to impose and sanction internally fines against its members, and its power to compel enforcement of these fines outside of the association itself in the external
forum of the state courts. This would lead us to make a preliminary
inquiry as to the legitimacy of the internal imposition and sanction
of fines. Was there here a sufficient voluntariness in the adherence
74

75
76

In this case, the unions resort to a state court to collect internal union
fines.
Re the 1959 legislation see note 24 supra.
I.e., § § 7(a), 8(b) (1) (A) of the 1947 act.
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of members to the union in a union-shop situation for there to be
true "membership" at all? Hauriou recognized the room for a certain element of involuntariness, 77 but an enlistment in a union compelled by sheer political or economic pressure would not suffice to
impose an "institutional" obligation (i.e. even within the union
itself) to pay the fines. In the context of this case such a "compulsion"?7 8 situation would fit comfortably within the statutory ban
on "coercion," at least where the union member had not gone
beyond the minimum dues payment requirement and assumed
"full" membership.
Once adequate voluntariness was established to constitute membership, Hauriou's notion of droit disciplinaire would support the
power of a union to internally sanction violations of policies and
rules and votes taken in furtherance of the understood objectives
of the group, provided these were established according to the processes fixed by the group, and provided that the fines were imposed
according to the procedures which had been fixed. These last considerations relate, of course, to his notion of droitstatutaire. Hauriou
was sufficiently a jurist of positive law to recognize that the internal
law of the group was subject to certain restrictions imposed by the
positive law of the state. The law might not only establish minimum
internal due process (as did the 1959 legislation) 79 but also might
restrict the power of a union in its internal discipline to use the
sanction of fines. But Hauriou's concept of an "institutionalized"8 0
group was that it had implicit disciplinary powers (such as power
to enforce reasonable sanctions internally), and that the positive
law should be interpreted on the assumption that the legislature was
aware of this incident of the "reality"81 of the group. This view
"Institutions are founded thanks to a power, but this power leaves
room for a kind of consent; if the pressure exercised does not go as
far as violence, the assent given by the subject is valid juridicially;
coactus voluit, sed voluit," La th6orie de 1institution, supra note 2, at 2.
78 The legal question, of course, is what degree of compulsion-economic,
political, or merely psychological-will be required to constitute "coercion" in law. There will inevitably be borderline situations. The
disagreement among the judges on this point suggests that AllisChalmers is such a case. See Comment, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 47 (1966).
70 See note 24 supra.
80 We use this term here in the sense of an organized group which had
achieved a degree of internal organization and "communion" of its
members in basic objectives ("ideas"). See not 9 supra.
81 Hauriou argued that an "institutionalized" group (unlike a mere
occasional aggregate, or a group held together by force) has a "real"
personality, as distinguished from a mere 'fictional" personality. La
thdorie de Vinstitution, supra note 2, at 42-43. This theoretical debate
has stirred up less interest among common lawyers than among continental jurists. But cf. F. W. Maitland, Moral Personality and Legal
77
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leaves room for the possibility that some groups (unions) may not
have a true "communion" in basic objectives among members, but
may be mere aggregates held together by legislative or economic
force. These last groups might well be viewed as so many individuals acting in a common group name, whose legal "personality,"
if any, was purely "fictional."
Given a "real" as distinguished from a "fictional" group, that is,
an organized group of persons working together under accepted procedures to achieve group objectives, Hauriou viewed state legislation as "limits" upon its free activity, rather than as authorizations
of its activities, or mere ascriptions to it of powers and rights. Given
such a real group then, Hauriou would expect a clear statement from
legislation before he would read it as depriving the group of customary internal disciplinary power which was keyed to achievement of group objectives. The imprecision of the "coerce" language
of 8(b) (1) (A) would hardly fill Hauriou's bill for restricting
internal imposition and collection of union fines. To limit such a
reasonable and traditional aspect of internal group life the legislative language would have to be more clear, and not otherwise satisfactorily explained.82
Different considerations arise when we turn from the internal
imposition and collection of fines to the union's resort to public
compulsion through the national and state courts. Hauriou would
dismiss at once consideration of the "expulsion from membership"
proviso; for collection in the courts goes beyond a union's internal
affairs, and the proviso may be read as a mere reiteration of the
union's obvious rights as an "institution"-to regulate its membership and internal affairs. The question remains whether external
collection of fines is "coercion" within the statute. The union here
goes outside its internal affairs, beyond the activity which is normal
to the operation of a private group. No longer is the proper question: Did Congress clearly ban fines (as it was with respect to
internal fines) ?a It may now fairly be put in this way: Was the
Personality, SELECTED ESSAYS 223f (1936); Professor H. L. A. Hart's
Inaugural Lecture, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence,70 L.Q.R.
37 (1954), for all its great influence, did not entirely cut off the debate. See Derham, Theories of Legal Personality, LEGAL PERSONALITY
AD POLITICAL PLURALSm 1 (Webb ed. 1958). And see the Webb volume generally.
82 Note the explanation of some of the judges in Allis-Chalmers that this
language was directed to violence in organizing activities.
83 Justice Brennan asked this same question re both internal collection
and court collection of fines. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
Justice Black, on the other hand, asked another question (alike for
internal and court collection): Did Congress give unions power to
impose fines? See text accompanying note 59 supra.
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union authorized to seek outside public help to bring its members
to heel? It is hardly to be doubted that it could be so authorized
(especially where such resort was not against the fixed internal
arrangements which its members had stipulated to live under).
Such authorization by the external national legislature might well
be a Themis rule of the national society,8 imposed perhaps because
of the national concern to strengthen the adhesiveness of labor
unions. The question henceforth is not one of internal union law but
of the existence of a national policy (whether in legislative rule or
judicial decision) authorizing such external conduct. If there is such
authorization, the activity of the union in following it by suing to
collect fines in the courts is hardly "coercion," at least not coercion
in law under 8 (b) (1) (A).
The two questions for determination in the Allis-Chalmers case
are thus narrowed, on Hauriou's analysis, to these: (1) Is there a
national policy authorizing such court enforcement? (2) Under the
established arrangements of the national society who is to make
this policy determination, the legislature or the courts?

C. HAUROU'S CRTEIA FOR DEALING WIn ThE QUESTION OF POLICY
The easy answer to the question whether there is a national
policy authorizing unions to enforce their fines against members in
the civil courts would be that the applicable legislation so provides.
One of the few things in this case upon which all the judges agreed
was that the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, did not
expressly contain any such authorization. The judges resort to the
broad policies of the national labor legislation led to conflicting
generalizations: The legislation was calculated to strengthen the
labor unions; a5 the Taft-Hartley (1947) amendments were designed
to protect the individual union member in his right to work.8 6 One
broad policy would lead to supporting court enforcement, the other
against it.
The precise import of the argument that upholding court
enforcement of fines would advance the policy of assuring effective
unions came to this: that in the situation of a weak union, expulsion would be an inadequate penalty for such a flagrant membership
violation as strike-breaking. 7 The argument is that this need, which
84

85

See text accompanying note 6 supra.

As Judges Hastings and Kiley and Justice Brennan stressed.

86 Cf. Judge Knoch and Justice Black.
87

See text accompanying note 59 supra. The argument is that the
member would prefer to leave a "weak" union rather than to pay a
large fine, and the union could not afford to expel him because of the
weak membership situation. The Allis-Chalmers case did not, in fact,
involve a weak union (UAW locals).
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had not been specifically foreseen by Congress, should be satisfied
by the courts. Justice Brennan purported to do it by the analysis
which we have criticized. Justice Black labelled the result a judicial
manufacture of policy which properly belonged within the legislative competence. This leads us to the final question: Assuming that
such a specific policy is desirable in the light of the broad national labor policy, should it be proclaimed by the courts or by the
legislature?
Hauriou's inclination was against relying upon the equity of
judges.8 He also recognized that a court active in public law had a
role in development of policy which Hauriou called "jurisprudential
politics."8 9 His answer to the question, legislature or court? came
to this: it depends on the established arrangements of a particular
system. It is clear he would distinguish the legitimate area of judicial policy intervention in broad-gauged general clauses of constitutional law, from "jurisprudential politics" in areas such as the
labor field where Congress had entered with a fine-spun specifiicity.
The question in Allis-Chalmers would, then, be narrowed by
Hauriou to this: Should either policy, that of union-strengthening,
or that policy (akin to droit statutaire) of limiting further pressures
upon union members, be presently furthered; and, if so, did the task
fall to Congress or to the Court? It is likely Hauriou would find the
answer, as did the judges we have studied here, a close one, ultimately the product of judicial "art."
Hauriou's analysis uncovers various other elements in the factual picture in Allis-Chalmers which must be taken into consideration in reaching an answer here. The decision permitting union fines
elevates the "economic" value of strong unionism, at the expense of
the "political" value of non-multiplication of the constraints of persons who are union members. Intervention by the court or the
legislature on behalf of the union here does not advance, but rather
retards, a vital pluralism in the society. For every time the state
takes sides in a group-member controversy it limits the autonomy
of the "institution" itself,90 sometimes, as here, tilting the internal
balance against the membership minority. The notion of a policy
88

He repeatedly makes this point, See, for example, Hauriou's "Note"

to the celebrated case involving a special doctrine of "frustration" in
droit administratif. M. HAURiOU, NoTEs D'ARRETS, M, 578, 601 (1929),
("God save us from the equity of the courts.")
89 This was a frequent characterization which Hauriou made of the
function of the Conseil d'etat as an administrative court. Id. at 601,
for example.
90 Intervention here by the court would both benefit the minority (protesting) members, and impair to that extent the union's autonomy.
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to further the standing of a "weak" union does not throw the emphasis where Hauriou desired, i.e., towards specially favoring those
groups which had secured an effective membership consensus (communion of the members in the "leading ideas"). It rather favors
those which had not.9 1
D. CRmcIsm

OF THE

EFFEcTIVEEss

OF OTHER APPROACHES

At the outset of this study we noted elements in Hauriou's
theory that could be used for criticism of the Supreme Court's pre-

vailing opinion in Allis-Chalmers. We may close by examining in
the light of Hauriou's thought other approaches to the solution of
this problem. We have seen that Hauriou has no sympathy with
Justice Black's approach-merely searching the legislative language
for positive ascriptions to the union of the capacity which it claimed
(concerning imposition and collection of fines)-or with Justice
Brennan's insertion of policy veiled by the discredited fiction of
"contract." What of the two opinions we have seen which were
closest to an institutional approach? Too generalized for Hauriou's
taste are Judge Kiley's opting for the union on the grounds of "common good,"9 2 and Judge Hastings' formula based on grounds of a
necessary "union solidarity."93 The approach of "balance of interests" proposed in a Note 94 on the Allis-Chalmers case would be
closer to Hauriou's. This view would "balance the interests" of
"genuine strike morale among the bulk of membership [as] a factor
crucial to the union's ability to call a successful strike" against the
"NLRA's bias against coercion and in favor of persuasion as the
technique of union cohesion." 95 Still, striking such a balance leaves
much to judicial preference, and Hauriou was frank to avow his
own ultimate preference in favor of freedom from constraint.
Hauriou's institutional theory was developed in the course of
his writings in his major field of professional concern, French administrative law (droit administratif). The growing interest today in
the internal government of private groups suggests that a legal
theory of "institution" may have a usefulness in areas beyond the
labor union situation which we have explored here as a type of
organized social group brushing against our public administrative
and judicial system.
91 Cf. the argument that the reason for permitting court collection of
fines is to help a weak union. The strong unions are adequately
protected by their power to expel members for non-payment of fines.
92 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
93 See text preceding note 37 supra.
94 Recent Cases, 80 HARv. L. REv. 683, 687 (1967).
95 Id.

